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PUBLIC WATER, PRIVATE LAND : 
ORIGINS OF THE ACREAGE LIMITATION CONTROVERSY, 1933-1953 
In 1976 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco 
sent a series of shock waves along clearly defined fault lines of 
California agriculture. The court ruled that the federal reclamation 
laws dating to 1902 mean what they say : Heavily subsidized irrigation 
water can be distributed only to 160 acres per individual landowner, 
and anyone holding more than a quarter section must dispose of the 
1 excess land if he wishes to receive reclamation water. The ruling 
occasioned surprise and consternation in some quarters, for it seemed 
to presage major alterations in the land-tenure pattern of the Central 
Valley of California, and potentially on reclamation projects through-
out the West. The only real occasion for surprise, however, was that the 
issue should have required recourse to the courts at all. The acreage 
limitation policy was clearly established legally, had been praised by 
both political parties, and seemed an equitable principle for distribu­
ting the benefits of public spending. The Ninth Circuit's ruling raised 
three questions of historical significance. Why was the 160-acre law 
only erratically enforced for three quarters of a century? Why did the 
issue arise in particular in the Central Valley, where the land-tenure 
pyramid presented the very problem the reclamation laws were designed to 
avoid? Why, indeed, did a liberal administration in power when the Cen­
tral Valley Project began operation not only fail to enforce the excess 
land law, but raise the most serious threat to the redistributive prin­
ciple of reclamation? 
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This article attempts to answer these questions� which lie 
at the root of the modern controversy over the 160-acre law  While 
 considering reclamation policy as a whole, the study focuses oh the 
 Central Valley, which has been the fulcrum of the dispute for 
 four decades. Interpretations of the key role of the Bureau o 
Reclamation after World War II have varied. Some persons cdnt
Bureau upheld the 160-acre law. Others, notably Paul S. TaJlo
Ninth Circuit, pinpoint the Bureau's failure to uphold the lcr 
.tation, but they are concerned mainly with legal analysis.2 1 
drawing on previously unused archival sources, analyzes legis 
 and particularly administrative practices, in the changing po 
I environment from 1933 through 1953. I argue that the decisiv 
 for the demise of the excess land law is traceable not merely 
. conservative attack but to changes in liberal ideology and �o 
I after World War II. The Franklin D. Roosevelt administration !endorsed 
the family farm and the redistributive purpose of reclamatif n;I the 
Harry S. Truman administration subordinated both ideals in fa�or of 
connnercial agriculture and economic growth.  
Federal reclamation policy since its inception in l the 
Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902 has espoused twin objectivfs :I to make 
barren land productive and to distribute the benefits of purl�c spend­
ing widely. The Reclamation Bureau has achieved the first goal 
superbly. Federal spending for reclamation averaged $8.85 ii 
annually before 1928. With the construction of Boulder Dam l iJ 1928, 
the Bureau's first true multiple-purpose project, the agency 
its modern character of massive construction and a prominenh 
ssumed 
ole for 
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hydroelectricity as well as irrigation. The New Deal's emphasis on 
public works and on public over private electrical power caused the 
Bureau's appropriations to spurt to an annual average of $52 million 
from 1933-1940; funding reached a one-year record of $359 million in 
1950. The number of acres irrigated under reclamation projects 
reached 4,460,979 in 1946 and 10,929,824 in 1975. At first the Bureau 
mainly watered lands that had been taken from the public domain. By 
the 1920s, however, two-thirds of the acreage that received project 
water had been privately held when construction began. In the 1930s 
the agency began to provide "supplemental water" to farms that were 
already irrigated but needed more water. In the Central Valley all 
the farms to receive Bureau water were privately owned and in the 
majority of cases they would get supplemental water. The application 
of the acreage limitation would be especially sensitive and important 
in the Central Valley, where the Bureau would be putting public water 
on private land.� 
The second goal -- the redistributive principle -- was 
achieved at best imperfectly, but it was of crucial importance because 
of the heavy subsidies water users received. Wide distribution of 
benefits had inhered in reclamation law since the 1902 Act. Its 
father, Representative Francis G. Newlands of Nevada, explained : "We 
have not felt in this country the evils of land monopoly • • That 
will be the test of the future, and the very purpose of this bill is 
to guard against land monopoly and • • . to give to each man only the 
amount of land that will be necessary for the support of a family . •
Water users had to repay construction charges over a period of forty 
" 
years, which began after a ten-year "development period" had l run. But 
 they were not charged interest. At an interest rate of 3 peifcent, the 
subsidy would amount to 57 percent of the cost over forty �e�rs; at 
5 percent it would equal 7 4  percent.  The Comptroller Genera1 of the 
 
United States estimated that the interest�free financing aloie gave 
water users on the Central Valley Project a total subsidy bf $1.2 
billion. Water users received a further subsidy on annuall owerating 
costs beca�e an average of about 65 p•rcent of the i�i"ll,,n exp�� 
were paid by users of reclamation-generated electricity. ren the 
Central Valley Project began operation in 1947 water useri w�re charged
$2.70 per acre-foot. If all the subsidies were eliminate! and an 
interest rate of 3 percent were assumed, the charge would rave been
$8.36 per acre-foot; at 5 percent interest, the toll would have mounted 
4 to $10.80 per acre-foot. 
The device chosen to insure wide distribution lofl benefits 
was to restrict the water an individual landowner could rece�ve to the 
amount needed for 160 acres. The limit applied to water, lnot land. 
The distinction was crucial, for water rights were usufru,tu�ry rights
upon which conditions for beneficial use could more easily b imposed 
 The 160-acre limit first found than on fee simple titles in land. 
 
Since the laws lac�ed enforce-expression in the Acts of 1902 and 1912. 
ment provisions, however, land speculators often vitiated 
intent. The Act of 1914 therefore required landowners to 
dispose of their excess lands on terms designated by the Seqretary 
of the Interior if they wished to receive project water. ID�fficulty 
in enforcing the provisions of the 1914 Act after a project lhad 
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been initiated left it nearly as fruitless as its predecessors. 
Accordingly the Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926 required holders of 
excess lands to sign "recordable contracts" before receiving project 
water. Under these contracts the landholders agreed to sell their 
excess lands within ten years at an appraised price that excluded 
any increased value from irrigation. Recordable contracts proved 
effective on the Vale, Owyhee, and Deschutes projects, and suggested 
that the Omnibus Adjustment Act could control speculation and realize 
the distributive intent, if it were implemented.5 
In an arbitrary mathematical symbol lawmakers tried to 
express a bundle of economic and social objectives. The ideal of the 
family farm reflected the agrarian myth; the 160-acre threshold was 
derived from the Homestead Act. On early projects a quarter section 
frequently exceeded the amount a family could fully utilize. As farm 
sizes grew, 160 acres proved too small for some soil and climatic 
conditions. But the debates over 160 acres as a figure too often 
obscured its importance as a symbol. The family farm and quarter 
section were vehicles for broader purposes : distributing the benefits 
of public subsidy widely during the progressive era, redistributing 
wealth during the New Deal, and fostering democratic communities.6 
After 1926 Congress dealt with the excess land issue on an 
ad hoc basis. The redistributive principle was extended in two cases. 
The Columbia Basin Project Act of 1937 gave the secretary of the 
Interior.authority to reduce the maximum to as little as 40 acres; 
revision of the act in 1943 permitted him to vary the size from 40 to 
160 acres depending on the acreage needed to establish a viable farm 
6 
unit. The secretary also received authority to purchase excess lands 
in order to facilitate their redistribution. Congress appJieM the 
160-acre standard to the Arch Hurley (Tucumcari) Project iJ New Mexico
in 1937, even though the project provided only supplementaJ wtter. The Department of the Interior firmly supported both enactJen s.7 
I Two exemptions also surfaced, on the Colorado-Big l Thompson Project in Colorado in 1938 and the Truckee Project in NevJda in 1940. 
�::.::�'::�hi:�:::�l:·�.::,::::.:l::::::·�::.:::: ::Jr:�:::::·:, 
 Congressional pork barrel politics, their economic merits were dubious. 
Congress said the two measures did not establish precedentJ for 
I further exemptions. Endorsements for both laws slipped through the 
 Department of the Interior without the approval of Secretary rarold L. Ick••· He w� livid wh� he lea�ed bela<edly of <he 11•• ole•.' 
The most serious drawback to realization of the r�distri­
butive intent had been lax administration. When Ickes inqjir�d about
the acreage limitation in 1934, the Bureau told him it had lbeen "a 
dead letter for years" and that it was better 
lie." Little enforcement was attempted until 
three reasons. First, legal interpretations were clouded. 
in force in the 1930s derived in part from a 1914 ruling by B' 
Chief Counsel Will R. King which allowed landowners to recli 
more than 160 acres if construction charges were paid in fll 
excess lands. King' s  opinion was dubious, as would becomelc 
family-farm adherents examined it closely; meanwhile, howeve 
opened an important escape hatch for larger landholders. 
early in its history the Bureau had also 
dogs 
for 
gulations 
water for 
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allowed a husband and wife to receive water on 160 acres each. This 
informal practice received recognition as a fait accompli in a solici­
tor's decision in 1945. Second, it was often difficult to find buyers 
for excess lands, especially in the 1930s, when many farms had been 
foreclosed. A program of federal purchase or government credit would 
have promoted the breakup of excess holdings. Third, the Bureau gave 
priority to "practical engineering" -- the construction and operation 
of the physical works -- over reclamation's social objectives.9 
As a result of this weak enforcement, the Bureau had at 
best a mixed record for distributing its benefits. A survey of land­
ownership on Bureau projects in 1946 revealed that small and medium­
sized ownerships predominated but that some projects had serious 
violations of the excess land law. The agency provided water to 
4,030,167 acres divided among 106,338 ownerships. The holders of 
160 acres or less numbered 102,853 or 96.6 percent of the total; 
their farms embraced 2,802,245 acres or 69.5 percent of the total. 
In the medium-sized category (161 to 640 acres) 3,255 owners held 21.2 
percent of the total. The .3 percent who enjoyed a square mile or more 
held 9.3 percent of the total; these barons owned 50.3 percent of the 
land in excess. Overall 30.5 percent of the acres were in excess of 
the land limit. In many cases the landholding pattern probably 
reflected the conditions that existed before reclamation projects began 
rather than the effects of enforcement. Nevertheless the Bureau, in 
part fortuitously, had avoided large-scale subsidies to large farms 
and agribusiness corporations that would have solidified a skewed 
landholding pattern.lo 
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The Central Valley Project (CVP) encountered, l hlwever, 
the very land tenure problem Representative Newlands had fe red. The 
Bureau's greatest venture, CVP by the 1970s carried a totll l price tag 
of $2.3 billion, of which $1.1 billion was allocated to ikrtgation 
. I and repayable to the government; CVP irrigated 2.3 million acres. 
Mexican land grants, sanctioned by lax American courts, hab ¢reated in
che Califo=ia a pyr�idal land at=oture that waa proba+ylmore 
severe than in any other state. In 1945 the Bureau of Agricultural 
 Economics studied irrigable landholdings in three countiis t- Madera, 
Tulare, and Kern -- that appeared to be representative 0£ the CVP 
service area. It found that 955,700 irrigable acres wer1 dtvided among 
9,551 owners. Some 8417 owners who enjoyed 160 acres or Ile s apiece 
held by 
early held 377,900 acres or 40 percent of the total, compared to 
 70 percent on other Bureau projects; in other words 60 perc 
 
land exceeded the acreage limit. Medium-sized farms of 16 
 totaled 272,000 acres or 28 percent of the whole; they wer 
:nt of the 
to 640 acres 
952 owners or 10 percent of the total. Large farms (641 1 a9res or more)
-- owned by 182 owners or 2 percent of the total -- embrac�d 305,800 
 
acres, or 70 percent of the land in excess, compared to 50 
 
other Bureau projects. The farms larger than a square mil� comprised 
32 percent of the total acreage, more than triple the 9.3 
Bureau projects at large. If the agency's minimal enforle· 
I 
carried over to CVP, the Bureau would find itself subsidiz:!Jng massively 
h 1 . . 11  t e argest economic interests. 
CVP, said Arthur Goldschmidt, one of Ickes' advlsers, 
offered "the best opportunity now available for correctilg the land 
pattern of California." The secretary agreed. "I am dehi edly of the 
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opinion that we ought to do everything in our power to enforce the 
160-acre limitation • • .  ," Ickes said in 1940. The Department 
readied an enforcement campaign in preparation for the beginning of 
CVP operations after the war ' s  end. Harry W. Bashore, a veteran 
agency engineer who seemed more attuned to Ickes ' social goals, 
became commissioner of reclamation in 1943. The Department launched 
two dozeri major studies of the potential social effects of the 
project. In November 1943 Ickes, Bashore, and President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt told the National Reclamation Association � an opponent of
the excess land law -- that they i-ntended to apply the statute to all 
CVP lands.12
The enforcement campaign reflected a maturation of Ickes ' 
and his advisers' commitment to the redistributive purposes possible 
because of the growth of the reclamation program. One facet was public 
power. As huge dams, such as Bonneville on the Columbia, neared comple-
tion, the crucial question became how the electricity at the dams would 
be distributed. Moderate and conservative interests wanted the govern-
ment to sell power to private utilities and to consider power a "cash 
crop" on which the government got top dollar. But Ickes and his liberal 
coterie insisted that the government string its own transmission lines, 
give priority to municipal and cooperative distribution facilities, and 
levy low rates. Since he found the Bureau of Reclamation too conserva-
tive, Ickes formed a Division of Water and Power in his office in 1941 
to supervise power distribution and related issues. The division ' s  
first head, lawyer Abe Fortas, promptly announced : "Water and power 
must be distributed to the people without private profit.11 13 
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The second facet was what I have termed elsewhere tlhe "community 
New Deal." Beyond the ideal of the family farm, New Deal boijnnunity 
programs embraced diffused property ownership as the firstl s¢ep toward 
a planned ideal 
organic view of 
cooperation and 
individualism. 
cooperative commonwealth. Community New Dia 
society that would be roughly egalitarian an 
. I group life would assume more importance than 
Franklin Roosevelt believed that reclamatibn 
ers had an 
in which 
traditional 
projects 
should.not benefit "the man who happens to own the land atl tll.e time" 
but should provide small tracts that would "give first chance to the 
. I ' Grapes of W�ath ' families of the nation." He envisioned j 4omprehen-
sively planned Columbia Valley Project that could support 801000 new 
families in agriculture and 20,000 others in small agriculbute-related 
businesses.14 
Before the enforcement campaign could bear fruitJ the 
I Department had to fight off a conservative challenge that thrleatened 
I 
the very existence of the 160-acre law. Representative Alfred J. 
I 
Elliott attached a rider to the rivers and harbors appropriadion bill 
I in March 1944 that would have exempted CVP from the acreage ]imitation. 
I Elliott, a farmer from the Central Valley town of Tulare, where some of I the largest landholdings were located, charged the Departmin� was
"trying to socialize agriculture and force Communism upon thej people of 
 the San Joaquin Valley." Land might be sold to undesirabl� pleople, he 
warned; "remember the Japanese and the trouble we had with lthlem." 
Caught by surprise, the Department could not keep the Hous� f�om adopt-
15 ing the Elliott rider. 
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As the battle shifted to the Senate, the Bureau tried to 
devise a compromise. The Elliott amendment had crystallized under-
standing of the home-building and antimonopoly components of reclamation 
policy among Bureau personnel, Commissioner Bashore noted. But many 
Bureau officials felt the 160-acre law was too strict and difficult to 
administer in an area of established agriculture, such as the Central 
Valley. Moreover, they doubted they could win a straight-out fight 
to preserve the law. Favoring a revision of policy, they felt the 
change was dictated by political considerations. Some went so far as 
to suggest that the acreage limitation should not apply to anyone 
holding land before CVP was authorized. A more moderate proposal would 
have given landowners of any size water but levied a surcharge for excess 
lands.16 
Secretarial officials dismissed the proposals out of hand. 
The Bureau's attitude was "not even that of an enlightened banker," said 
Fortas, now under secretary. The secretariat refused to compromise an 
ideological issue -- the type of society federal subsidy should 
encourage in the Central Valley. Assistant Secretary Oscar L. Chapman 
considered the rider part of a larger attack on the community New Deal 
that pitted "the organized big men against the unorganized little men; 
the kulaks against the peasants; the haves against the have-nots." 
Department spokesmen emphasized the importance of distributing the 
benefits of the subsidy widely and of developing farm communities. 
They relied on a study by a young Berkeley-trained anthropologist, 
Walter Goldschmidt, contrasting social patterns in two Central Valley 
towns. Arvin, characterized by large farms, had a more unequal 
12 
distribution of income, more farm laborers, and fewer retail 
'"'1 aocial �enitiea. Dinuba, cbaracteri,"1 by "'311 to �de 
farms, showed higher and more evenly distributed income, more: 
usinesses 
ate-sized 
farm owners 
and retail businesses, and greater social cohesion. Arvinlrebresented 
impermanence and alienation; Dinuba, stability and community.I Goldschmidt 
attributed the differences "confidently and overwhelminglyltol the scale-
17of-farming factor." 
Committed to the redistributive principle, mem0e 
I 
Department secretariat knew political backing could be mobil 
I 
Support came from some farm organizations, church groups, la 
I 
and veterans groups. Liberal to moderate senators praisei 
the family farm. The most devoted ally was Robert M. La Fol 
I of Wisconsin, who had become aware of the social problems er 
I the Central Valley's land tenure pyramid during his investig 
migratory labor. When La Follette.and his allies threatenld 
 ·buster, the Senate leadership dropped the Elliott amendment. 
same time the Interior Department scored another victory whe 
the 
or unions, 
ated by 
tion of 
to fili-
At the 
it got 
the Senate to insert the acreage limitation principle into! t�e bill 
authorizing the Pine Flat Dam on the Kings River in Califo�nia. Although
I Roosevelt and Ickes wanted the Bureau -- the logical agenc¥ +- to build 
I 
the dam, the Army Corps of Engineers used its congressional $upport to
win the site. The Corps promised large landowners exemptjon l from the 
acreage limitation; while the Department might have offerjd !he same 
I 18 lure in order to get the dam, it stuck to the 160-acre prirc ple. 
After the Interior Department's successful de�en e in 1944, 
however, disquieting signs began to multiply. The years �94u-46 marked 
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a transition in both personnel and policy. Fortas resigned at the end 
of 1945. In February 1946 Ickes fell out of the Cabinet in a celebrated 
dispute with the new president, Harry S. Truman, over the nomination of 
oil millionaire Edwin Pauley as under secretary of the Navy. "Honest 
Harold's" successor was Julius A. Krug, an electrical power engineer who 
had served as chairman of the War Production Board, which had epitomized 
cooperation between big industry and government. Krug, a protege of 
Bernard Baruch and David Lilienthal, had mildly liberal leanings; the 
new secretary's main interest appeared to lie with expansion of federal 
power facilities but shorn of their redistributive potential. A "muC.h 
more passive" influence on the Department than Ickes, Krug tended to 
wait until a "crisis built up so that he was forced into a corner and it 
had to be solved," noted one of his assistant secretaries, Warner W. 
Gardner. Krug elevated Chapman to under secretary, a position he held 
until December 1949, when he assumed the secretaryship upon Krug's 
resignation. Chapman, though among the more liberal of Truman's Cabinet 
members, both changed his ideas and tacked to the right as an act of 
political survival. Amiable and conciliatory by nature, he hated to 
make tough decisions even when forced into a corner.19
Krug and Chapman allowed the new commissioner of reclamation, 
Michael Straus, much freedom of action. A former Chicago newspaperman, 
Straus had been an effective publicist for Ickes in the 1930s. Assistant 
secretary from 1943-1945, Straus took an ostensible demotion to serve as 
commissioner of reclamation from 1946-1953. The new commissioner's 
attitude was "largely political and bureaucratic in the best sense," 
warned Fortas. "He is principally interested in obtaining work and 
jurisdiction and is not greatly interested in the social and economic 
20 problems." 
Shifts in liberal thought reinforced. the personn 
The redistributive concepts important to one wing of New Dla 
I were submerged by the new emphasis on economic growth. Trum
tration economists, notably Leon Keyserling, argued that t�e 
I 
partnership between government and business had proved capit 
I of an almost unlimited. expansion that would obviate the need
14 
changes. 
thought 
adminis-
artime 
!lism capable 
for redis-
tributive policies. Economic growth constituted "the veryleslsence of 
our development as a nation," said Chapman. The growth emph 
I that the Bureau of Reclamation placed most importance on inc 
capacity of dam and irrigation works; how the products werl . 
became secondary. Valley authorities, for which Ickes and!F 
held high hopes, gradually lost favor in the Department un i 
Chapman abandoned them:entirely. He also shifted from pribr 
sis meant 
easing the 
istributed 
rtas had 
by 1950 
ty for 
low-rate federally· controlled distribution of power in CVPltd distribu-
tion through Pacific Gas and Electric Company at higher cost . 
I substantial profit for the private utility. A Department�wi 
I 
on postwar policy in late 1945 revealed that the ideal· of the
 
as a way of life was giving way to a primary concern with th  
ment of successful farms operated as business enterprises.r
Department should not abandon the family farm outright, iti 
said, but it "should recognize that this is a period of cult 
and with 
e seminar 
family farm 
"develop-
The 
and planners 
ral transi-
tion." Indeed, the year 1945 marked the beginning of whatlJdhn Shover 
has termed the "great disjuncture" in American agriculture� when tech­
nology, large-scale farming, and government policy worked i .flundamental  
21 
alteration in the structure of agriculture and rural life. 
The acreage limitation came under attack againl wlien the 
Republican-controlled Eightieth Congress convened in 1947. alifornia 
15 
Senator Sheridan Downey, a Sacramento lawyer who specialized in irriga-
tion cases and had "substantial" landholdings in the Central Valley, 
introduced a bill to exempt CVP, the San Luis project in Colorado, and 
the Valley Gravity project in Texas from the 160-acre law. Though he 
had been a Bull Moose Progressive in Wyoming, and Upton Sinclair's 
candidate for lieutenant governor of California in 1934, Downey turned 
out to be increasingly conservative after reaching the Senate in 1938. 
Downey and his supporters stressed the difficulties of applying the 
limit in an area of established agriculture. The Bureau was "planning 
and plotting the destruction of a free economy to institute totalitarian 
rule over the Central Valley," he charged. The opponents of redistri-
bution held a strongly individualistic view that subordinated community 
values to economic goals as determined through private enterprise. 
Central Valley agriculture and its accompanying social patterns resulted 
from the inexorable working of natural geographic and economic forces, 
they argued; the market rewarded those who demonstrated the most skill. 
They called on the Department to "just put water on all .of the land and 
treat all of our citizens without discrimination." Government policy 
should assist in the release of individual energies, as James Willard 
Hurst observed of nineteenth-century legal theories; government efforts 
22 to achieve greater equality of result were anathema. 
The Downey bill caught the Interior Department searching 
for an acreage limitation policy. The Bureau continued to argue that 
some policy changes were desirable and, in any case, politically 
necessary. Its committee on compromise legislation professed adherence 
to the family farm ideal but proposed various adjustments upward. The 
most significant allowed holders of any amount of excess land to pay a 
surcharge and continue receiving supplemental water if thelse�retary 
determined this were necessary "to prevent the deterioration pf estab­
lished communities." Krug, however, disliked the proposall blecause 
they were too vague and did not eliminate all subsidies to lla/r:ge land­
owners. He doubted the 160-acre limit would harm established communi-
. I 
16 
ties. Rather, "a breakup of the large holdings might in tim� improve 
rather than deteriorate the community," he said. He seemld ,particularly 
impressed by the arguments made for a firm stand by Richar� �oke, a 
veteran New Deal publicist and bureaucrat whom Ickes had aipdinted in 
I 1945 to head reclamation Region II which supervised the CVP 'j "Frankly, 
no •ngge•tion ha• yet be� made that i• more in keeping 'llh the prin­
ciples of Reclamation than the acreage limitation in the p
r
e ent law," 
the secretary pointed out in January 1947. He told the Bureau to hold 
the line at 160 acres.23
Straus and the Bureau found themselves in a diJle 
. I 
They 
did not want to fight for the 160-acre law, but they dared abandon 
it outright. Several political inducements encouraged thJ B 
weaken the 160-acre law. First, it wanted to mitigate thJ i 
I Washington bureaucracy. Straus stressed that the Bureau 
l
as 
prosecuting agency." Second, some of the projects the agenc' 
I 
undertake were not feasible if ownership were limited to 160 
of 
"a 
I 
although many persons argued that such land was not worth ir�igating, 
Bureau's desire to expand pushed it towards projects of dim�nishing 
cost effectiveness. Third, power generation had assumed imdortance 
equal to or greater than irrigation. Controversial in itie�f, public
power might be retarded if controversy swirled around thel eicess lanu 
to 
the 
law. Fourth, the Bureau was trying to fight off the inte�lqping Corps 
17 
of Engineers in the Central Valley. Raising the 160-acre limit might 
divert some of the Corps' support to reclamation.24 
Yet Straus could not have abandoned the excess land law 
openly, even if Krug had been willing. Straus knew, as his predecessor 
had observed, that .the 160-acre law was indispensable to reclamation 
appropriations, particularly among liberals, who were the most receptive 
to federal spending. Nonwesterners in Congress looked askance at recla-
mation until they learned it was "a settlement and homesteading program," 
said Bashore. "As long as reclamation projects fulfill that purpose, 
public endorsements and public funds can be secured for reclamation 
projects • •  II To a large extent the Bureau's political dilemma dis-
tilled into a question of constituency. A powerful, well organized 
constituency stood to benefit directly from abandonment of the excess 
I 
land law, but there was.no constituency in being that stood to benefit 
directly from the law's enforcement. While such a constituency could 
perhaps have been created, as occurred with legislation supporting 
industrial unions in the 1930s, it remained a potential rather than an 
active constituency. Meanwhile the preservation of the redistributive 
principle relied on a generalized constituency for which the 160-acre 
25 law was but one of many social welfare goals. 
To escape from this political dilemma Straus devised a 
subtle strategy that called for rhetorical adherence. to the acreage 
limitation but which, through a program limited to "technical compliance" 
with the law, eschewed actual enforcement. Testifying in 1947, Straus 
defended the land limitation. But he limited his arguments mainly to 
enforcing the laws passed by Congress, curbing speculation, and pre-
serving the historic principle of reclamation policy. Straus exhibited 
little of the ideological fervor that had characterized the 
I 1944; reclamation's contribution to correcting the land part 
building community was conspicuously absent. The commissfon 
rhetorical defense mollified supporters of the law. But Jt 
18 
efense in 
rn and to 
r's 
:he same 
time he explained to opponents how to avoid its substance /thtough tech-
nical compliance. Straus volunteered that if a corporation had ten 
stockholders,·it would be entitled to water for 160 acres lpe� partner. 
He also suggested that a landowner could deed out 320-acre parcels to 
his married relatives and children and remain in technical cfmpliance. 
The commissioner raised laughter when he acknowledged thaJ sbch devices 
I would not constitute "spiritual compliance," but he hastel).edl to say that 
technical compliance was good enough for him. 
Straus's recitation "blithe." Downey continued to insist [
harsh and unworkable. Straus cajoled: don't worry, we're 
I Perhaps because· the commissioner's virtuoso performance too 
out of acreage limitation, the Downey bill died in commitbe 
Quietly and apparently without informing Krug l 
ey termed 
sting
I already begun to implement the technical compliance programJ Thwarted
in its attempt to change the law legislatively, the Bureal qhanged the 
law administratively. Technical compliance entailed two irdblems -­
bringing older projects with long-standing violations intb 4ompliance 
and devising escape hatches for new projects. The agency! struck first 
at projects already in operation, particularly those auth
l
br 
the 1926 Act introduced recordable contracts. Although the 
u�er•hip ••�ey elaimed that enfure��t had red�ed vi� 
minimal 3. 7 percent, Straus acknowledged privately that man 
violations" had to be corrected. Regional directors strJss 
zed before 
1946 land-
ions to a 
"serious 
d that 
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compliance would be obtained only when excess landowners realized 
enforcement would proceed "at any cost," including shutting off the 
water of recalcitrant owners. The commissioner's office shrank from 
such tactics, however; it would not go beyond voluntary measures. 27
Voluntarism required new exceptions. Rather than force 
immediate breakup by withholding water, Straus decided to apply the 
recordable contract technique. The excess landowners, who had been 
receiving water they were not entitled to for as much as four decades, 
would now receive water for another decade before having to sell. Some 
regional directors complained that the grace period was excessive. "No 
progress towards securing compliance will be achieved until the end of 
that period," said one; "efforts toward enforcement made so far would 
be largely nullified." This tactic suffered from the further disability 
that it lacked specific statutory authority, said Chief Counsel Clifford 
Fix. He got the solicitor to approve the stratagem, nevertheless, 
because he found it analogous to the purpose of breaking up the larger 
holdings. Although Fix cautioned that "we should avoid expressing the 
idea that any degree of 'compliance' with the statute is thus effected," 
the Bureau happily transferred these older excess lands to the "not in 
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violation" category as soon as they came under recordable contracts. 
Another, more far-reaching administrative device -- acceler-
ated or lump-sum payment of construction charges -- struck directly at 
the redistributive principle. Straus theorized that the acreage limita-
tion would lapse as soon as construction charges were paid off. During 
the normal forty-year period for payout, excess landowners would have 
to dispose of their excess lands to receive project water. But if the 
payout period were accelerated, or perhaps even coincided with the 
20 
:!initial operation date of the project, no one would have to disi;1oseof 
Jny excess lands to receive project water. This proposition reduced 
I I jeclamation policy to that of a banker interested only in the return of 
liis capital investment, and it ignored the continuing heavy subJidles 
1arge landowners would receive during the project's operations. I It was
lven less effective than the surcharge proposals, which would have 
lecovered part of the operating subsidy. 29 
I Accelerated payout needed a veneer of legal respecttbi�ity. 
The associate solicitor, Felix Cohen, provided it in October 1917 PY  I iimply putting his name to an opinion, M-35004, supplied two days !earlier 
ty D.M. Hudson of the office of the chief counsel of the Bureauf IThe Hudson­
�ohen opinion held that early payout of construction charges would free 
I I excess lands from the limit whether they were covered by water-rilllht 
lpplications, which were filed by individuals, or whether they lame 
I I under the joint liability contracts of such organizations as irri 
listricts. The opinion turned on Section 3 of the 1912 Act, whlctt read 
I is follows: " • • •  no person shall at any one time or in any lll¥nrler, 
rxcept as hereinafter otherwise provided, acquire, own, or holdji�rigable 
iand for which entry or water�right application shall have beenl made • • •
I , refore final payment in full of all installments of building and tietter-
ment charges shall have been made • • •  per single ownership oflpiivate 
I , _J land for which a water-right may be purchased • • . nor in any ca�e in 
bxcess of one hundred and sixty acres, nor shall water be furnibhed 
I -  under said acts nor a water right sold or recognized for such excess 
  
[I'he opinion relied on King's instructions of 1914, which it
 interureted 
�s saying flatly that early payout removed the acreage limitatibn1on 
lands held under water right applications.30 
II 
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Having established this principle for the lands held by 
individuals, Hudson applied it to tracts covered by joint-liability 
contracts in irrigation districts. In the Acts of 1922 and 1926 district 
contracts supplanted water-right applications; he argued that with these 
instruments Congress desired merely a change of form,not of policy. 
Consistency demanded that the same early payout provisions he had just 
established for the individual contracts should apply to district con-
tracts. "Otherwise, substantially different acreage restrictions might 
result" simply because joint-liability contracts had superseded water-
right applications. He held therefore that, by Section 3 of the 1912 
Act, lands receiving water under a joint-liability contract were relieved 
of the excess-land restrictions upon full payment of contruction charges.31
The opinion was riddled with problems. In December 1961 
Solicitor Frank J. Barry overruled it with an exhaustive opinion that 
left the 1947 statement in tatters. In 1976 the Ninth Circuit expressed 
amazement at the Hudson-Cohen opinion's "obvious" errors and "surprising 
superficiality." The court attributed the legal flaws to the Bureau's 
32political maneuvering. 
One of the principal problems with opinion M-35004 was that 
it relied on the instructions devised by King in 1914, and misread them 
to boot. King's findings had been "reached largely on 'feel and hunch', 
with not much law to support it • • •  ," cautioned a regional counsel in 
1947. The phrase "nor in any case in excess of one hundred and sixty 
acres" appeared to mandate the acreage limitation. But assuming the 
section were ambiguous, Hudson might have had recourse to legislative 
history; instead he relied on King, who had not read legislative 
history either. The misreading stemmed from the failure to realize that 
b2 
King was dealing with the normal, not an accelerated, payout per 
Secretary of the Interior Walter Fisher said in 1914 that Sectlo 
would "prevent the consolidation of holdings" until full paymeht 
I building charge had been made. "By that time it is believed tha 
land will be in the hands of permanent settlers and speculativl 
ad. 
3 
of the 
the 
oldings 
eliminated." This was because at the time of the enactment ofl tll.e 1912 
:::e::ei:::::d::: ::::: ::te::e:: ::a::ob:::::.th:u::��o:::0r::::::::tor 
 Barry pointed out, King had said only that the 1912 Act could be l construed 
"to pe-t" delivecy of �ter to excm larufa after payout, n+ that mb 
deliveries "could be demanded as a matter of right." Barry argued that 
 even after the normal payout period, the Secretary of the Interior 
could permit the delivery of water to excess lands only if it lfulfilled 
33 the purpose of establishing family farms. 
More serious still, M-35004 ignored key provisions bf lthe 
Acts of 1914 and 1926. These laws added the "crucial" requirement that 
excess lands be disposed of or recordable contracts signed beflre their
I owners received project water. King's instructions did not enco�pass 
the 1914 Act, which was passed six weeks after he filed his opkn1on. 
I The 1914 and 1926 Acts did not merely change the form of contracq, as 
 Hudson contended, but added provisions designed to make the excess land 
idea effective. The legislative history of both acts indicatel �upport 
for the acreage limitation -- part of a pattern of consistent laqgres­
sional backing for the 160-acre law from the passage of the NeLlands 
Act through the rejection of the Elliott amendment.34 
The administrative route was more circuitous than Dowqey's 
legislative exemptions, yet exemption by bureaucracy raised peih4ps 
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greater dangers. The legal interpretations could apply to any reclama­
tion project, and their very subtlety made them more insidious. The 
operation recalled James Willard Hurst's observation of the momentous 
consequences that could flow from obscure legal processes. "By enlar­
ging or restricting the scope of such concepts as 'property' or 
'navigability, 111 Hurst wrote, "lawmakers could favor one interest and 
subordinate another, in a fashion so quick and quiet, so economical of 
analysis, seeming so routinely logical in its application of accepted 
values, that • • •  the ranking of interests" could proceed virtually 
unnoticed. Perhaps equally serious, the willingness of midcentury 
liberals such as Cohen, Chapman, and Straus to revise laws administra-
tively to fit their policy goals betrayed a contempt for the law itself. 
In 1951 Chapman, frustrated with Congress' failure to pass legislation 
authorizing federal development of the oil-rich "tidelands," induced 
his solicitor to file a severely strained interpretation of the Surplus 
Property Act that gave him the authority to start a leasing program. 
The act applied to such mundane items as surplus typewriters, however, 
and Congress administered a humiliating rebuke to Chapman's legal 
35 maneuvering. 
No matter how deficient its legal scholarship, the Hudson-
Cohen opinion furnished the motive power for the technical compliance 
drive. Although it was one of the most important solicitor's opinions 
of the Truman period, the Bureau omitted it from the Department's annual 
compilation of decisions; it was available only in mimeograph. The opinion 
was not submitted for formal secretarial approval, but Bureau and Department 
officials accepted it as an authoritative policy statement. As secretary, 
Chapman informally praised the technical compliance program, at least on older 
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projects; he misleadingly cited the lump-sum payment device as 
"in strict accord with the Reclamation laws as determined by ih 
I 
ciate Solicitor." These informal affirmations were soon reinfo 
a str±ng of contracts implementing the lump-sum payout provis�o 
 
December 1947 Straus issued Administrative Letter 303 in which 
fie1d officer. eo iniciate action in ac�rd=ce with the opi+ 
of the first contracts was signed with the Klamath Drainage Dis 
1948, where accelerated payment lifeed the limitation• for 11 o 
with 13,489 excess acres, or a mean of 899 acres. Lump-sum Ion 
were negotiated with 58 water user districts from 1948 through 
eing 
As so-
ced by 
In 
e asked 
One 
rict in 
erships 
received the approval of the secretary's office. In several cases other 
aspects of the renegotiated contracts required submission to Corgress, 
and the repayment provisions received congressional approval as part of 
the overall perfunctory review. Straus's strategy was bringin 
36 much paper compliance on older projects. 
The wide-reaching implications of accelerated payou 
clear when the Bureau moved to apply it to new projects, not1b 
I 
forth 
became 
1Y the 
en in Central Valley. Secretary Chapman had assured uneasy Congress 
early 1951 that the lump-sum device was not being considered l fqr any 
California project. Later that year he learned from an artifl 
San Francisco News that Straus was thinking of applying Admini 
in the 
trative 
Letter 303 to the area served by the Pine Flat Dam. So long! as the 
Corps of Engineers kept.control of the dam, the large landowne 
Kings River service area hoped to receive irrigation water ult 
hy <he acr�ge limitati=· Under the "Fol"m FonmM'enu�+t 
Truman in 1948, the Corps of Engineers was to transfer contµol 
s in the 
oubled 
d by 
of the 
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dam to the Bureau when it became operational. Reclamation law would 
apply, as New Dealers had made sure in the 1944 act. A stroke of Truman's 
pen would have resolved the issue in favor of reclamation law, but he 
left the situation for the Eisenhower administration, which eventually 
effected the transfer. Anxious to add Pine Flat to his empire, Straus 
was willing to abandon the acreage limitation one of the crucial 
policy distinctions between the Corps and the Bureau. He advised Chapman 
that a lump-sum payment of construction charges by the Kings River water 
users should be accepted as lifting the acreage limitation because such 
an arrangement would follow "entrenched" Department policy enunciated in 
opinion M-35004. The secretary avoided committing himself, saying merely 
that he wanted his staff to give the matter priority attention. Nothing 
happened, however, until October 1952, when defenders of the 160-acre 
law found their fears borne out. The Bureau office at Fresno, California, 
assured the Kings River district that "the proposed lump-sum payment 
contract, which you requested and we furnished, would remove the excess 
land restrictions of Reclamation Law ,.37
Supporters of the 160-acre law mobilized and, rightfully 
suspicious of the Reclamation Bureau's and Interior Department's inten­
tions, carried their appeal to Truman. James G. Patton, president of 
the National Farmers Union, warned the chief executive: "Unless you act 
fast and decisively, your Administration is about to go down in history, 
ironically, as the one that pulled the plug on American family farm 
policy. " Truman appeared uninformed on the issue, however, and passed 
Patton's letter to Chapman for an explanation of "what he is talking 
about. " The Missourian had issued generalized statements in support of 
the family farm; unlike his predecessor, however, he had not publicly 
26 
endorsed the excess land law. In fact in 1952 Truman signed a bill 
raising the acreage limit to 480 acres on the San Luis ValJey l project 
To Truman reclalation meant in Colorado, despite Chapman's objections. 
chiefly expansion of economic capacity.38  The secretary responded in December 1952 with a rrace of 
memoranda that further clouded the situation and gravely disappointed 
supporters of the acreage limitation. The memoranda were �itten by 
the Program Staff, a small group of policy experts who funitibned as
Chapman's liberal conscience. In a memorandum to Truman, Chapman implied, 
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that lump-sum or accelerated payments would be an acceptabJe alternative 
<o <ho applica<ion of ft• �cm landa limi<a<ion," ho •4· I Th• = 
to Truman seemed to mean that, while Chapman would not app�y the Hudson­
Cohen opinion to new projects, it was a valid legal interpjetation and
was acceptable for older projects. 39
At the same time, however, Chapman sent a memorandum to 
Straus that seemed to contradict two vital points. First, l"in accord-
ance with the policy statements set forth" in the memorandum to the 
president, the secretary said, "I am instructing you • • • 1to!refuse to 
accept � lump-sum or accelerated payment of construction lch rges from 
� individual or organization which would, under Opinion M-3 004 as 
construed by Administrative Letter 303" free the individuaJs �r organi­
zations from the acreage limitations. Chapman specificallJ tbld the 
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commissioner not to negotiate such a contract on the Kings River. 
Second, the secretary denied that the opinion carried secretarial 
approval and represented departmental policy. Since the opinion did 
not set forth any policy, Chapman said, it had not been submitted to 
40or approved by the secretary. 
The memoranda to the president and the commissioner contra-
dieted each other on both policy and law. It was clear that Chapman 
would not apply accelerated payout as an overall policy. But on older 
projects the presidential memorandum said lump-sum payments were 
acceptable, while the memo to the commissioner said they were not. If 
the latter were correct, all the contracts recently signed and endorsed 
in the presidential memo, including 36 Minidoka project contracts 
approved by Under Secretary Vernon Northrop in the past two weeks, would 
be invalid. Furthermore, the secretary's attempt to separate the legal 
and policy issues -- two halves of the same walnut -- blinked at reality. 
Opinion M-35004 had emerged from the Bureau's technical compliance cam­
paign, which was a matter of policy. In any event Chapman implicitly 
approved the Hudson-Cohen opinion and cited it explicitly as the basis 
for the accelerated-payout contracts he had approved. The Department 
treated the opinion as authoritative until it was specifically limited 
by the solicitor in 1957 and overruled by the solicitor in 1961. Taken 
together the actions of December 12-24 -- the Minidoka contracts and 
Chapman's memoranda -- had confused more than clarified. It was as if 
the secretary faced a multiple-choice test with the options "all," 
41 "none," and "some of the above" and checked all three. 
Incredulous, Straus conferred with Chapman on January 6, 
1953. He recounted the meeting in a memorandum to the files, which was 
apparently the only record made of the session. According to Straus, 
Chapman said "he had not realized the effect of applying bhe 
told the commissioner to disregard it. The commissioner jon 
I policy had thus reverted to the status quo ante. Straus 
I
ve 
however, or perhaps was not informed of, Chapman's final ,ta 
the question. On January 17 the secretary wrote Senator Pau 
a letter in which he reiterated the substance of policy iJ t 
to Straus but left the Hudson-Cohen opinion untouched. 
Chapman retired from office, leaving policy as murky as 
that sometimes enveloped: the Central Valley,42
TJre
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Nearly everyone connected with the issue was unh 
feared the "fuzzy" and "schizophrenic" situation blocked �h 
I of accelerated payments on the Kings River. Under Secretar 
 
considered his superior's instructions "obviously • • • ill 
 
the form issued." Fred A. Clarenbach of the Program Staff 
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order" and 
idered that 
looked, 
ement on 
Douglas 
e directive 
days later 
ule fogs 
'PY• Straus 
application 
Northrop 
advised in 
hrew up his 
hands and wondered, "What is present Department policy?" I Bqt Chapman 
redistri-had particularly disappointed the liberals who supported th 
butive principle. "We certainly deserved better from the l aJowed friends
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the Commissioner of Reclamation answers the problem that r 'ave posed. 
" The farm leader pointed out that the secretary had l done nothing 
more than promise not to approve lump-sum payment contradtslon new 
projects during his few remaining days in office. But tJe '(cey elements 
-- Adniftis<rative Letter 303 and the Hudeon-Cohen legal i•'tion 
remained intact to be implemented by later administrations. f3 
The Truman administration's legacy differed m1rk�dly from 
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its predecessor's. The Roosevelt administration had resurrected a 
nearly forgotten principle and fought to maintain it against severe 
odds. Liberals from 1946-1953, lured by economic growth and bureau-
cratic desire, buried the policy considerations in a blizzard of legal 
technicalities. At the crucial moment when federal policy could have 
triggered some redistribution of landholding in the Central Valley, 
Truman-era liberals elected instead to use federal subsidies to rein-
force the most skewed land-tenure pattern in the nation. The accelera-
ted payout mechanism continued in use through the 1950s and removed 
the threat of breakup of large holdings on older projects. On newer 
projects, particularly in California, accelerated payout was used by 
many water user districts to buy their way out of the acreage limitation. 
They were finally rebuffed by the federal courts, the branch of govern-
44ment that has been the staunchest defender of the excess land law. 
But beyond the lump-swn payment, the technical compliance 
strategy as a whole that Straus pioneered continued as the Bureau's 
approach to acreage limitation into the 1970s. A host of legal techni-
calities, ranging from deeding excess lands to family members to appor-
tioning 160 acres per person in investment trusts, have produced a 
paradox: In California there was almost perfect paper compliance on 
Bureau projects, but subsidy to the largest interests was perpetuated. 
In 1970, 1,097,000 of the 1,287,000 excess acres receiving project 
water in the nation were in California. During the Truman administra-
tion the Bureau confronted one of the key challenges to liberal policy 
the question of which groups would benefit from subsidies contributed by 
the entire public. In their policies for putting public water on private 
land, Truman-era liberals used federal subsidy to reinforce rather than 
alter the distribution of power in society.45
30 
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Truman Administration: Personnel, Politics, and Policy" l(Plh.D. disser-
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from 1947-1951, contends that Straus "read the law and t:l!gh�ened up 
the program" (Warne, The Bureau of Reclamation [New York, 1�73], p. 18.) 
Paul Wallace Garen devotee munh attenri� rn the early y,arh of the 
excess land law but deals only briefly with the controvers� from the 
1930s to the present (History of Public Land Law Developjen 
[Washington, 1968], ch. 22). The leading authority on 60-acre 
law, economist Paul S. Taylor, is highly critical of the eau. Of 
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his many writings, "The Excess Land Law : Execution of a Public Policy," 
Yale Law Journal, LXIV (February 1955) ,  477-514, is most relevant to 
the period 1933-1953. Two key legal opinions the Ninth Circuit 
Court decision and an opinion by Solicitor of the Interior Department 
Frank J. Barry in December 1961 (68 I.D. 370) are highly critical 
of the Bureau of Reclamation's legal maneuvers. The most unusual 
perspective is found in Harry J ,  Hogan, Acreage Limitation in the 
Federal Reclamation Program (Arlington, Va. : National Water Commission, 
1972, distributed by National Technical Information Service, U. S. 
Department of Commerce) . Hogan, a devotee of large-scale farming and 
the mythical free market, provides abundant evidence of the means used 
to evade compliance with the 160-acre law, and applauds the loopholes : 
"The flexibility and comprehensiveness of the evasive and meliorative 
techniques excite admiration. In difficult circumstances over six 
decades the Bureau of Reclamation and the irrigation farmer, with the 
tacit, and sometimes express, approval of Congress, have brought off 
what must be regarded as a remarkable triumph in public administration" 
(p. 97) .  
Limited to the 160-acre law, this article does not deal 
with two other controversial areas of reclamation policy. One is 
the widely ignored requirement that water users be bona fide 
residents. The residency requirement was upheld in 1972 by Senior 
District Judge William Murray of Montana visiting in the Southern 
District of California (Yellen v. Hickel, 352 F. Supp. 1300) ,  and the 
case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit. Some persons believe that 
enforcement of the residency requirement would entail more far-reaching 
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consequences than the acreage limitation. Another issue is l the sale 
of water rights, for which see Joseph L. Sax, "Selling Reblamation 
I 
Water Rights : A Case Study in Federal Subsidy Policy," Mi4higan 
Law Review, LXIV (November 1965) , 13-46. 
3. Donald C. Swain, "The Bureau of Reclamation! and the
New Deal, 1933-1940," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, LXI (Jult 1970) , 
142; Gates, History of Public Land Law Development, pp. 6rl l l 698;
Oversight Hearings, House Subcommittee on Water and Power Resources 
of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Acreage_ L}mitation 
Provisions of Reclamation Law (Washington, 1976) , p. 13. 
4. 35 Congressional Record 6734; "Acreage Limitation in 
the Central Valley -- A Report on Problem 19, Central Val�ef Project 
Studies," Sept. 25, 1944, Paul S. Taylor Papers, BancrofJ L brary, 
University of· California at Berkeley; Richard Boke to Edslon Abel, 
Jan. 31, 1947, File 742, Records of the Bureau of ReclamJtibn since 
1945, Record Group 115, · Reference Branch NatioJall Archives, 
Washington, D.C. (hereafter NA) ; Sax, "Se�ling. Reclamatijn Water 
Rights," n4; Comptroller General of the United States, cdn ess Should
Reevaluate the 160-Acre .Limitation on Land Eli ible to RJce ve Water 
From Federal Water Resources Projects (Washington, 1972) ,I p 10 
(hereafter Comptroller General report). 
K. Pelz, 
5. Yellen v. Hickel, 352 F. Supp. 1300 at 1306-7 ; Richard 
ed. , Federal Reclamation and. Related Laws AnnotJte ·, 3 vols. 
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(Washington, 1972), I, 31:...39, 177-183, 197-8, 376-387; William E .  
Warne, "Land Speculation," Reclamation Era, XXXIII (August 1947), 
176-180 . 
6 .  For data on desirable farm sizes on early projects see 
the report by F .  H .  Newell, Jan . 27, 1913, and the responses from the 
field on which it was based, File 262-B3, Records of the Bureau of 
Reclamation, General File, 1902-1919, Record Group 115, NA. Some 
recent studies suggest that farms of 160 acres, or 320 acres for 
husband and wife, are still economically viable in the Central Valley . 
See George Goldman, et al. ,  Economic Effect of Excess Land Sales in 
the Westlands Water District (Berkeley: University of California 
Division of Agricultural Sciences, Special Pub . 3214, June 1977) .  
E .  Phillip Leveen argues that large farms are not inherently more 
efficient but in part reflect applications of technology and other 
matters of social choice. See his statement in Senate, Joint Hearings 
before the Select Conunittee on Small Business and the Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, Will the Family Farm Survive in America? 
(Washington, 1976), pp . 189-202 . The debate over farm sizes has 
tended to obscure another point: From a strict market analysis, 
federal reclamation projects are not economically viable to start 
with; farms receiving project water are profitable in large part only 
because of the heavy federal subsidy . If the issue of economic 
viability fades, the question of who benefits from the subsidy assumes 
still greater importance . 
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